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Originalism and Congressional Power 
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
Christopher W. Schmidt∗ 
Abstract 
In this Essay, I argue that originalism conflicts with the 
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence defining the scope of 
Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the 
standard established in Boerne v. Flores, the Court limits 
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to statutory remedies premised on judicially defined interpretations 
of Fourteenth Amendment rights. A commitment to originalism as 
a method of judicial constitutional interpretation challenges the 
premise of judicial interpretive supremacy in Section 5 
jurisprudence in two ways. First, as a matter of history, an 
originalist reading of Section 5 provides support for broad judicial 
deference to congressional constitutional interpretive authority. 
Second, even if one accepts originalism as the best way for courts to 
interpret the Constitution, this assumption does not necessarily 
apply to nonjudicial actors when they are fulfilling their own 
constitutional responsibilities—such as members of Congress 
acting to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Placing judicial originalism into the foreground of our discussion 
of Section 5 jurisprudence thus offers additional support for a 
broader reading of the congressional enforcement power than exists 
today under Boerne. 
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I. Introduction  
This Essay considers the relationship between originalism and 
the scope of Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment. I approach this topic by exploring the provocative 
hypothetical William Araiza presents in his important and 
enlightening new Article, Arming the Second Amendment—and 
Enforcing the Fourteenth1: a federal statute, based on the 
enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that protects 
the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms beyond those rights 
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in District of Columbia v. 
Heller.2 Araiza uses his hypothetical to illuminate flaws in the 
Court’s current enforcement power doctrine and to propose a 
different approach that would be more consistent and effective in 
defining the scope of the enforcement power.3 
Araiza’s central argument is that the doctrine the Supreme 
Court has developed to determine the scope of congressional 
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—the 
                                                                                                     
 1. William D. Araiza, Arming the Second Amendment—and Enforcing the 
Fourteenth, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017). 
 2. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The right that Congress would be enforcing would 
be the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process of law, which the Court has 
read to include the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms. McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Araiza, Arming, supra note 1, at 1804–06. 
 3. Araiza’s Arming the Second Amendment builds on and expands his 
previous work on the enforcement power. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2015); William D. Araiza, The Enforcement Power in Crisis, 
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1 (2015); William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: 
Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of 
Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367 (2014); William D. Araiza, 
Deference to Congressional Fact-finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting 
Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (2013); William D. Araiza, New Groups and 
Old Doctrine: Rethinking Congressional Power to Enforce the Equal Protection 
Clause, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 451 (2010).   
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provision that empowers Congress to “enforce, by appropriate 
legislation,” the rights guaranteed in the amendment4—centers on 
the wrong object of analysis. Under the standard the Court 
established in Boerne v. Flores,5 Congress has the power under 
Section 5 to pass legislation to protect Fourteenth Amendment 
rights as long as these statutory remedies are premised on 
judicially defined interpretations of these rights.6 When Congress 
uses its Section 5 authority to protect against rights violations, 
these preventative measures must be “proportional and congruent” 
to the scope of any record of constitutional violations by the state.7 
Araiza argues that this congruence and proportionality analysis 
should be based on “core constitutional meaning,” rather than the 
“decisional heuristics” the Court has developed in order to 
implement that constitutional meaning.8 Thus, in the context of 
his hypothetical legislation enforcing the Second Amendment’s 
right to bear arms, the proper baseline for measuring congruence 
and proportionality should be the meaning of the Second 
Amendment rather than the doctrinal gloss the courts have 
developed in their case law as they have adjudicated disputes 
involving this constitutional right. And this core constitutional 
meaning, according to Araiza, following the premise of the Court’s 
reasoning in Heller, derives from the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment.9  
I find Araiza’s argument persuasive to the extent that, 
working within the contours of existing constitutional doctrine, as 
defined by both Boerne and Heller, he offers an improved version 
of the Section 5 doctrine. Compared to the Court’s current doctrine, 
Araiza’s approach is more solidly grounded in the original meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 By paying more attention to the 
relative institutional competencies of the Court and Congress, it 
offers a more functional enforcement power. And Araiza’s 
alternative produces a clearer and more predictable Section 5 
                                                                                                     
 4. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5. 
 5. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 6. Id. at 539. 
 7. Id. at 520. 
 8. Araiza, Arming, supra note 1, at 1847. 
 9. Id. at 1851–56, 1895–96. 
 10. Infra Part I. 
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doctrine.  His distinction between constitutional meaning and 
constitutional doctrine improves upon the excessively juricentric 
nature of the Court’s current interpretation of Section 5.11 His 
approach does not require Congress, when exercising its own 
constitutional responsibilities, to adopt the posture of an inferior 
court, whose job is to discern and apply the often complex 
peculiarities of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. 
Araiza’s less juricentric doctrine also offers a doctrine that allows 
Section 5 to better serve its democracy-enhancing role.12 Araiza, in 
short, offers a better Section 5 doctrine.  
In this essay I press on Araiza’s analysis on one dimension, 
questioning his assumption that the original meaning of a 
constitutional provision, as determined by the Court, constitutes 
the “core constitutional meaning” that should be the baseline for 
measuring the scope of Section 5 authority.13 
Araiza’s hypothetical federal gun regulation offers an 
opportunity to reconsider the assumptions that define the 
constitutional landscape of the post-Boerne, post-Heller world. 
Even if, for the sake of argument, we accept original meaning as 
the best way for the Court to derive constitutional meaning in 
adjudicating constitutional disputes, it does not necessarily follow 
that originalism is the appropriate baseline from which we assess 
the scope of congressional enforcement authority under Section 5. 
I offer two ways in which we can destabilize the linkage 
between the judicially determined original meaning of 
constitutional rights and the scope of congressional enforcement 
authority. The first is the original meaning of the congressional 
enforcement power. The history of the framing and ratification of 
the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates a 
                                                                                                     
 11. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the 
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003). 
 12. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional 
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 
NW. U. L. REV. 47 (2018); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by 
Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE 
L.J. 441 (2000). 
 13. My challenge to the operating assumption Araiza relies on in his Article 
is not a critique of his decision to make that assumption. Araiza’s approach is to 
work within the basic parameters the Court established in Boerne to identify a 
better approach to Section 5 jurisprudence. My approach, by contrast, is to 
question the parameters that Boerne established. 
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robust conception of congressional interpretive authority that 
would not be defined and delimited by judicial interpretations of 
the Constitution. The second is a conception of the Section 5 power, 
prominent before Boerne, under which the Court recognized a gap 
between judicial interpretations of constitutional meaning and the 
meaning that Congress attached to these constitutional provisions 
when using its enforcement authority.14 In resurrecting this lost 
approach to Section 5, I suggest that judicially derived originalist 
analysis could be treated, using under Araiza’s framework, as yet 
another decisional heuristic, and therefore not necessarily the 
baseline for “core” constitutional meaning—at least not when non-
judicial actors are expected to play a role in giving meaning to the 
Constitution. 
II. The Original Meaning of Section 5 
Considerable evidence shows that the history of the framing 
and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects an 
understanding of the enforcement power that is less deferential to 
Court-developed rules of constitutional interpretation than the 
model of the Section 5 power that Justice Kennedy offered in 
Boerne and that still holds today.15 There is a strong case, 
therefore, that an originalist judge should be skeptical of not only 
the doctrine-centered approach in Boerne that Araiza critiques, but 
also, more broadly, any approach to defining that Section 5 power 
that places the Supreme Court as a primary constraint on federal 
authority to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights. In other 
words, the very same commitment to originalism as the source of 
“core constitutional meaning” that motivates Araiza’s 
                                                                                                     
 14. I explore this theme at length in Schmidt, supra note 12. 
 15. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1801, 1805 (2010) (“[M]odern doctrine has not been faithful to the text, history, 
and structure of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. These 
amendments were designed to give Congress broad powers to protect civil rights 
and civil liberties …. Congress gave itself these powers because it believed it could 
not trust the Supreme Court to protect the rights of the freedmen . . . .”); Michael 
W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 194 (1997) (“In Boerne, the Court erred in assuming 
that congressional interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is illegitimate. 
The historical record shows that the framers of the Amendment expected 
Congress, not the Court, to be the primary agent of its enforcement . . . .”).  
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reconceptualization of how the Court should apply the Boerne 
model could also be used to undermine the Boerne model itself.  
The people who framed the Fourteenth Amendment and 
advocated for its passage believed that Congress, using its Section 
5 power, would play a leading role in protecting constitutional 
rights. They frequently referred to Congress and the possibilities 
of future congressional action under the Fourteenth Amendment; 
they referred only infrequently to the courts. Indeed, the leading 
advocates of the amendment were generally skeptical toward the 
Supreme Court.16 A central goal of the amendment, after all, was 
to overturn the Dred Scott decision17 and its holding that African 
Americans could not be citizens of the United States.18   
The Congress-centered mindset of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is reflected in the fact that the first 
version of the amendment was framed as entirely a grant of power 
to Congress: “The Congress shall have power to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of 
each State all privileges and immunities . . . and to all persons in 
the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and 
property.”19  Critics in Congress worried that phrased in this way, 
as an express grant of plenary power to Congress to define the 
rights of all Americans, the proposed amendment granted the 
federal government excessive control over the states.20 The Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction, which drafted the Fourteenth 
Amendment, eventually offered a new version of the proposed 
                                                                                                     
 16. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 15, at 182 (“Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was born of the fear that the judiciary would frustrate 
Reconstruction by a narrow interpretation of congressional power.”). 
 17. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 18. See generally JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 53–54 (1956); ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND THE SUPREME COURT 53–55 (1960); Eugene 
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 
1323, 1329-33 (1952); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original 
Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 165 
(1950). 
 19. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1033–34 (Feb. 26, 1866); see also 
BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
RECONSTRUCTION 46, 50–51, 61 (1914). 
 20. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1087 (Feb. 28, 1866) 
(Representative Davis warning of a “centralization of power in Congress in 
derogation of constitutional limitations”). 
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amendment that separated the definition of the rights in the 
opening section from the congressional enforcement provision in 
the closing section.21 Although the historical record does little to 
illuminate the reason the Joint Committee abandoned the original 
version and introduced the new one22 (members of Congress gave 
little attention to Section 5 in their debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment23), some scholars have argued the first version offers 
a key to identifying the ambitious, Congress-centered commitment 
of the amendment’s framers.24 
In Boerne, Justice Kennedy offered a different interpretation 
of this drafting history, presenting it as evidence of a commitment 
on the part of the drafters to a more limited conception of 
Congress’s enforcement power. “Under the revised Amendment,” 
he wrote, “Congress’ power was no longer plenary but remedial. 
Congress was granted the power to make the substantive 
constitutional prohibitions against the States effective…. The 
revised Amendment proposal did not raise the concerns expressed 
earlier regarding broad congressional power to prescribe uniform 
national laws with respect to life, liberty, and property.”25 After 
summarizing a member of Congress arguing for a more limited 
view of the enforcement power, Kennedy notes, “[s]cholars of 
successive generations have agreed with this assessment.”26  
Although Kennedy cited “generations” of scholars in support 
of his narrow reading of Section 5, scholars who have looked at the 
history Kennedy cited have questioned his interpretation of the 
material.27 He read the history in favor of his position that 
                                                                                                     
 21. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1095 (Feb. 28, 1866); KENDRICK, 
supra note 19, at 83–84. 
 22. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783, 798–99 (2002). John Bingham, one of the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, would argue during an 1871 
congressional debate that the change was immaterial to the underlying meaning 
of congressional power. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st sess., app. 83–86 (Mar. 31, 
1871); see also Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment—The Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 
123 (1986) (discussing Bingham explanation). 
 23. Colker, supra note 22, at 799–812. 
 24. See generally HARRIS, supra note 18, at 34–53; JACOBUS TEN BROEK, THE 
ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 187-190 (1951).   
 25. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 522–23 (1997). 
 26. Id. at 523. 
 27. This statement, McConnell notes, “must have slipped past the cite 
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congressional authority under Section 5 must be constrained by 
the Court’s interpretation of Section 1, based primarily on 
separation of powers principles. But the primary concern of the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress was not ensuring that the Court would 
constrain Congress (i.e., separation of powers). Rather, the 
primary concern in 1866 was federalism—a concern with how 
much power Congress could exercise under Section 5 vis-à-vis the 
states. As a matter of original meaning, questions of separation of 
powers and judicial supremacy were not explicitly considered by 
those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.28  
So even if one accepts that the revision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from a grant of authority to Congress to its final 
version indicated agreement that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not constitute an abandonment of the principle of state 
sovereignty, the question remains open as to the balance of power 
within the federal government when acting under the amendment. 
The framers simply did not leave much of a record of their views of 
the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.29 Although the issue has today 
become central to Section 5 doctrine, it was not an issue of major 
concern in 1866.  Furthermore, even if one accepts that the 
changed wording had some significance in pulling back on 
congressional power there remains the question of determining 
how much of a limitation the revision signaled. 
                                                                                                     
checkers. Even aside from the incongruity of making a claim about ‘scholars of 
successive generations’ when citing only two examples (Horace Flack in 1908 and 
Alexander Bickel in 1966), neither of the examples given supports the Court's 
reading …. The Court’s position—that Congress lacks ‘substantive’ power but 
that it could go beyond judicially defined rights under its ‘remedial’ power—is 
contradicted by both Flack and Bickel, the only historians whom the Court cited 
on this point.” McConnell, supra note 15, at 177 n. 151. See also Colker, supra 
note 22. 
 28. Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganic Marriage, 1969 SUP. 
CT. REV. 81, 94.  
 29. Consider, for example, one of the few statements on the floor of Congress 
during debate on the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly referencing Section 5. 
Senator Howard defended Section 5 because it “casts upon Congress the 
responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the sections of the amendment 
are carried out in good faith, and that no State infringes the rights of persons or 
property. I look upon this clause as indispensable for the reason that it imposes 
upon Congress this power and this duty.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 
2768 (May 23, 1866). 
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Further evidence of the broad original meaning of Section 5 
can be found in the fact that many of the people who were involved 
in the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment were 
also advocates for subsequent federal legislation designed to 
enforce that amendment.30 
Early precedents of the Supreme Court also reflect the 
prominence of this belief that Section 5 granted Congress broad 
discretion to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights—with the 
Court playing only a secondary, deferential role in the 
development of the Section 5 power. In its 1880 ruling in Ex parte 
Virginia,31 the Court upheld a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 that made it a crime to discriminate on racial grounds in the 
selection of juries. In upholding the indictment of a state judge for 
violating this provision, the majority opinion explained that the 
Reconstruction Amendments, including the Fourteenth, “derive 
much of their force from [their enforcement] provision[s].” “It is not 
said,” the Court continued, “that the judicial power of the general 
government shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to 
protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said 
that branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void 
any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the power 
of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to 
enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation.” The Court 
then outlined a deferential standard for assessing the scope of the 
enforcement power echoing the language the John Marshall had 
used in his canonical case recognizing broad discretion in Congress 
when exercising its constitutionally enumerated  authority, 
McCulloch v. Maryland: “Some legislation is contemplated to make 
the amendments fully effective. Whatever legislation is 
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the 
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission 
to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the 
                                                                                                     
 30. ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A 
SWORD 36 (1947) (citing as “[p]erhaps the best evidence” that the framers of the 
Civil War amendments “meant them to serve as a basis for a positive, 
comprehensive federal program” the fact “that during and just after the period 
when the Amendments were framed, Congress passed seven statutes establishing 
just such a federal program” (citation omitted)); McConnell, supra note 15, at 
175–76; Colker, supra note 22, at 814–17. 
 31. 100 U.S. 339 (1880). 
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enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal 
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not 
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.”32 
The reasoning in this passage reflects an assumption, prevalent at 
the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the 
years immediately following, that when it came to the scope of 
Section 5 authority, the Court should basically defer to Congress’s 
judgment in determining the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Thus we can see that the history of the framing of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as early legislative and judicial 
efforts to interpret the scope of Section 5, point toward a robust 
Section 5 authority in which Congress, not the Supreme Court, is 
the institution understood to have primary responsibility to 
interpret the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s rights 
protections. Boerne’s assumption that it is the particular role of the 
Court—and the Court alone—to define the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by the original meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Originalists have tended toward judicial interpretive 
supremacy.33 But in the context of Section 5, originalism conflicts 
with judicial interpretive supremacy. Considering the history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, when it comes to the Section 5 power, 
the more faithfully originalist position is one that recognizes a 
                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 345–46. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let 
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.”) See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306–07 (1880). 
 33. Justice Scalia, for instance, advocated an extremely narrow conception 
of the Section 5 power. See Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 
721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Section 5 “prophylactic 
legislation” can be applied against a particular State only if it is first shown that 
“the State has itself engaged in discrimination sufficient to support the exercise 
of Congress's prophylactic power.”). Scalia viewed the Section 5 power as basically 
a subsidiary enforcement mechanism for the Courts. For a critique of Scalia’s 
approach, see Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: 
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Courts, Culture, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 33–34 (2003) (explaining that Scalia “confuses the judicial power of allocating 
individual blame and responsibility with the legislative power granted to 
Congress by Section 5”). 
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shared role for Congress in giving meaning to the protections of 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
III. Originalism, Judicial Legitimacy, and the Section 5 Power 
 
Having shown that an originalist reading of Section 5 provides 
support for broad judicial deference to congressional constitutional 
interpretive authority, in this section I turn to another reason an 
originalist may be skeptical of Boerne’s narrow, Court-centric 
reading of Section 5. My key point here is that much of the strength 
and appeal of originalism as a method of constitutional 
interpretation derives from claims about the particular 
competencies of judges and lawyers. The case for originalism has 
less force when applied to nonjudicial actors—such as members of 
Congress who are exercising their authority to enforce the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
To cite one prominent example, Justice Scalia defended 
originalism because of what he saw as its particularly judicial and 
lawyerly qualities. He described the Constitution as “in its nature 
the sort of ‘law’ that is the business of the courts—an enactment 
that has a fixed meaning that is ascertainable through the usual 
devices familiar to those learned in the law.”34  Scalia went on:  
If the Constitution were not that sort of a ‘law,’ but a novel 
invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would 
there be to believe that the invitation was addressed to the 
courts rather than to the legislature? One simply cannot say, 
regarding that sort of novel enactment, that “[i]t is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department” to determine 
its content. Quite to the contrary, the legislature would seem a 
much more appropriate expositor of social values, and its 
determination that a statute is compatible with the 
Constitution should, as in England, prevail.35 
 
Interpreting the Constitution, Scalia concluded, is “essentially 
lawyers’ work—requiring a close examination of text, history of 
                                                                                                     
 34. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 
(1989).  
 35. Id. 
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the text, traditional understanding of the text, judicial precedent, 
and so forth.”36 
This kind of defense of originalism may lead in two different 
directions. One is judicial supremacy: because the Constitution is 
a legal document, it should be left to judges and lawyers to tell the 
American people what it means. This was Scalia’s belief and it is 
the premise of Boerne. But there is another direction available, one 
that Scalia and most other originalists have eschewed but that 
nonetheless is consistent with Scalia’s defense of originalism. The 
other direction is some version of interpretive pluralism: when 
judges and lawyers are charged with interpreting the Constitution, 
they should rely on traditional legal tools to do so; but when 
nonjudicial actors are fulfilling their constitutional responsibility 
to give meaning to the Constitution—such as members of Congress 
when exercising their Section 5 authority—then they need not 
necessarily be so constrained. The flaw in Scalia’s defense of 
originalism, according to this approach, is not in his assessment of 
his role as the judge in interpreting the Constitution. Its flaw is in 
the idea that judges should be telling everyone else what the 
Constitution is. 
Even if one accepts that the Constitution should be treated as 
a legal document for purposes of judicial interpretation, it need not 
necessarily be this when those outside the courts are fulfilling their 
constitutional responsibilities. Franklin Roosevelt famously 
described the Constitution as a “layman’s document, not a lawyer’s 
contract.”37 The powers of the national government are defined, 
Roosevelt said, using “generality, implication and statement of 
mere objectives,” language that “flexible statesmanship of the 
                                                                                                     
 36. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 46 (1997). See also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxviii (2012).  
  Scalia was not alone among the pioneers of modern originalism in 
defending the theory based on particularly judicial concerns. See, e.g., Edwin 
Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
5, 10 (1988) (asserting that judges act properly when they evaluate the 
constitutionality of act using the Constitution’s plain words as originally 
understood because doing so “treat[es] the Constitution as the supreme law 
and . . . enforce[es] the will of the . . . democratic majority that ratified the 
constitutional provision at issue”).. 
 37. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day, Washington, D.C., 
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15459 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2018). 
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future, within the Constitution, could adapt to time and 
circumstance.”38 More recently, scholars who have defended 
various forms of extrajudicial constitutionalism have echoed 
Roosevelt’s characterization of the Constitution.39  
One need not be a dedicated popular constitutionalist to 
recognize that Congress’ Section 5 authority could be premised on 
an understanding of the Constitution as something other than a 
legal document. Take, for example, Michael McConnell, one of the 
most skilled and dedicated defenders of originalism,40 who has also 
written one of the most powerful critiques of Boerne.41 McConnell 
argues that Section 5 grants Congress more than simply the 
authority to provide remedies for judicially defined Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. His defense of a broad Section 5 power stems 
not only from his reading of the history of Section 5 (i.e., an 
originalist interpretation of Section 5), but also from his views on 
the distinct competency and legitimacy concerns of the judiciary 
and Congress. He writes:  
[W]hen Congress interprets the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
for purposes of carrying out its enforcement authority under 
Section Five, it is not bound by the institutional constraints that 
in many cases lead the courts to adopt a less intrusive 
interpretation from among the textually and historically 
plausible meanings of the clause in question. Because these 
institutional constraints are predicated on the need to protect 
the discretionary judgments of representative institutions from 
uncabined judicial interference, there is no reason for 
Congress—the representatives of the people—to abide by them. 
Congress need not be concerned that its interpretations of the 
Bill of Rights will trench upon democratic prerogatives, because 
its actions are the expression of the democratic will of the 
people.42 
McConnell advocates a middle-ground approach to 
congressional authority under Section 5, which he labels an 
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“interpretive” approach. In exercising its enforcement power, 
Congress should not be required to defer to the Supreme Court’s 
definition of the Fourteenth Amendment, as Boerne requires. Nor 
should Congress have unfettered “substantive” authority, which 
would permit Congress to “pass legislation based solely on its 
legislative judgment about what rights people should have.”43 
Under McConnell’s interpretive approach, Congress’ authority is 
constrained, but it is constrained by the Constitution rather than 
the courts’ interpretation of the Constitution. Congress would be 
limited to “good faith interpretations of the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, just as the judiciary is.”44 “The question 
in a Section Five case,” McConnell writes, “should be whether the 
congressional interpretation is within a reasonable range of 
plausible interpretations—not whether it is the same as the 
Supreme Court’s.”45 Although he does not delve into exactly what 
constitutes a “good faith” or “plausible” interpretation of the 
Constitution, I would posit that a dedicated originalist, 
particularly one whose originalist commitments derive at least in 
part from views of the distinctive capacities of judges and courts, 
could accept that nonjudicial actors might in good faith rely on 
nonoriginalist interpretations of the Constitution.  
This alternative approach defends originalism as the best way 
for courts to interpret the Constitution but it allows that 
nonjudicial actors may locate alternative readings of the 
Constitution—readings that may or may not align with the 
originalism of judges and lawyers. In many instances, when 
nonjudicial actors read the Constitution differently than judicial 
actors, the courts will need to exercise their authority to “say what 
the law is” and strike down the constitutional claim of the 
nonjudicial actor. This would be the case whenever a court 
concludes that a government action violates a provision of Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example. But in other 
instances, nonjudicial actors might engage in constitutional 
decision making by relying on a reading of the Constitution that 
diverges from a “judicial” reading of the Constitution (for an 
originalist, this would be one based on original meaning). The 
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courts would not need to strike down this act of constitutional 
decision making simply because it relies on a nonoriginalist 
reading of the Constitution.  
This then brings us back to Araiza’s diagnosis of current 
Section 5 doctrine. If we assume that a judge who chooses 
originalism as her preferred method of constitutional 
interpretation does so because, at least in part, she believes it is 
well suited to the role of a judge, then we might question Araiza’s 
equation of originalism with identification of “core” constitutional 
meaning. Originalism may be defensible as the best approach to 
constitutional interpretation for the judiciary, but an originalist 
judge could believe that a nonjudicial actor might, in good faith, 
adopt a method of constitutional decision making that is not 
originalist. A judicial originalist could accept that our 
constitutional system allows nonjudicial actors to rely on modes of 
constitutional engagement other than originalism—modes that 
are better suited to the institutional competencies of these 
nonjudicial actors.46 
Araiza equates originalist analysis with the derivation of “core 
constitutional law,” which he contrasts with “mere decisional 
heuristics” (such as the levels of scrutiny analysis).47 The former is 
driven by a search for constitutional truth. The latter by “concerns 
about institutional competence rather than a statement of core 
constitutional meaning.”48 But this point seems to be in potential 
tension with originalism as a theory of constitutional 
interpretation whose proponents justify it based on its suitability 
for judges. Why not treat originalism as a kind of “decisional 
heuristic,” justified in terms of the institutional competence of 
judges rather than some unique insight into the true meaning of 
the Constitution?49 
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Lawrence Sager, whose theory of underenforced constitutional 
norms Araiza draws on for his key distinction between core 
meaning and doctrinal heuristics, does not equate originalist 
analysis with defining the scope of “constitutional norms” and 
thereby deriving the “full conceptual boundaries” of a given 
constitutional provision.50 Sager defined an underenforced 
constitutional norm as “those situations in which the Court, 
because of institutional concerns, has failed to enforce a provision 
of the Constitution to its full conceptual boundaries.”51 He writes: 
“[I]t is appropriate for the Supreme Court to overturn a 
congressional enactment under [§] 5 if it finds that the enactment 
cannot be justified by any analytically defensible conception of the 
relevant constitutional concept.”52 If we follow Sager, to demand 
that Congress defer to originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would be the equivalent of saying that nothing but an 
originalist interpretation is “analytically defensible.” 
To sum up: a committed, conscientious originalist judge could 
believe that originalism is the best way for judges to interpret the 
Constitution while still recognizing that extrajudicial actors—such 
as members of Congress—might come to different conclusions 
when deciding on the best method of constitutional interpretation. 
The extrajudicial actor might, for example, believe that post-
ratification history or prudential concerns should play a stronger 
role in giving meaning to open-textured constitutional provisions, 
such as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. If an 
extrajudicial actor, acting on this reading of the Constitution, 
passes a law or engages in some other action that the Court deems, 
according to its best reading of the Constitution, to violate the 
Constitution, then the Court would strike down that law if it came 
before the Court in an appropriate case or controversy. But if that 
extrajudicial actor took an official action based on his best reading 
                                                                                                     
Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213, 2215 (2017) (“[M]odern originalists 
have tended to deemphasize the importance of constraining judges, relying 
instead on other arguments—that originalism is normatively desirable for other 
reasons, that it is an account of the true meaning of the constitutional text, or 
that it is required by our law.” (citations omitted)). 
 50. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1241. 
ORIGINALISM AND THE ENFORCEMENT POWER 49 
of the Constitution (which happened to be non-originalist)—and 
the resulting action or legislation did not violate any judicially 
defined constitutional limitations—then the conscientious 
originalist judge could very well recognize the legitimacy of 
methodological pluralism outside the courts. 
This recognition of the possibility of different methods of 
constitutional interpretation by nonjudicial actors might even 
serve to better protect the interests of the originalist judge. 
Originalism can be strong medicine; it can produce outcomes that 
are unpopular. In situations where other governmental actors who 
share constitutional responsibilities might not be constrained by 
originalism, an originalist judge might welcome sharing 
interpretive responsibility. It might be good for originalism and 
good for the courts if originalists did not insist on interpretive 
hegemony. 
Consider the example of Justice Hugo Black, who, while 
serving on the Supreme Court between 1937 and 1971, developed 
a jurisprudence based on textualism and history that in some ways 
anticipated the originalism that has come into vogue in recent 
decades. Although evaluations of Black’s judicial legacy rarely 
include his views on Section 5, he, perhaps more than any of his 
colleagues, embraced the idea that the enforcement provisions of 
the Reconstruction Amendments empowered Congress to address 
activity that would not necessarily be held unconstitutional if 
challenged in the courts. Justice Black’s sweeping reading of 
congressional powers under Section 5 was of a piece with his 
uncompromising rejection of his liberal colleague’s broad reading 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 
When, for example, the Court confronted the “sit-in cases”—
appeals of criminal convictions of participants in lunch counter 
protests against racially segregated lunch counters—Black was 
adamant that neither the business operators’ racially 
discriminatory policy nor the states’ use of race-neutral trespass 
laws to enforce these policies violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.54 Yet he insisted at the same time that Congress had 
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Section 5 authority to prohibit racial discrimination in privately 
operated public accommodations.55  
Black took a similar approach to a constitutional challenge to 
the poll tax. When the Court struck down the poll tax as violating 
the Equal Protection Clause, Black dissented.56 But he insisted 
that Congress had Section 5 authority to ban the poll tax “if it 
believes that the poll tax is being used as a device to deny voters 
equal protection of the laws.” He went on: “[F]or us to undertake 
in the guise of constitutional interpretation to decide the 
constitutional policy question of this case amount, in my judgment, 
to a plain exercise of power which the Constitution has denied us, 
but has specifically granted to Congress.”57 Black distinguished 
the act of constitutional interpretation (the work of judges) from 
the creation of “constitutional policy” outside the courts. The 
methods Black used, as a judge, to extract meaning from the text 
of the Constitution he did not demand that Congress apply when 
exercising its enforcement authority. 
The premise of Black’s Section 5 jurisprudence was his 
recognition of a gap between judicial interpretations of Section 1 
rights and congressional interpretations of Section 1 rights in the 
course of exercising Section 5 authority. Black believed that 
Congress could define for itself what the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment meant, even if that definition did not align 
with the way the courts had defined its provisions. For Black, and 
for the many others during the years of the Warren Court who 
accepted this idea of a Section 1–Section 5 “gap,” this premise was 
not some kind of bold or radical innovation. To the contrary, it was 
often advanced as a more cautious route to constitutional change, 
one that allowed Congress rather than the courts to take a leading 
role in confronting the challenges of breaking down the structures 
of white supremacy in American law and society.58  
If we believe that originalism’s justification rests in some part 
of the particular competencies of judges, then we should allow that 
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Congress may rely upon different interpretive tools when 
undertaking its constitutional responsibilities. In the context of 
Section 5, we might ask why Congress need necessarily to be 
limited to originalism as a methodology when exercising its role in 
giving meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black’s 
jurisprudence suggest that this could be a viable alternative 
approach for an originalist jurist. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this Essay I have revisited the questions Araiza introduces 
so provocatively in Arming the Second Amendment. If Congress 
were to pass a law designed to expand gun rights, using its Section 
5 authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, how should the 
Court evaluate the constitutionality of such a law? How might such 
a hypothetical illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of current 
Section 5 jurisprudence? I suggest that the very same analytical 
moves that Araiza uses to critique the Court’s current application 
of the Boerne standard could be used to question the Boerne 
standard itself. For the Second Amendment hypothetical demands 
that we confront Justice Scalia’s Heller decision, and this requires 
that we consider the place of originalism as a method of 
constitutional interpretation in Section 5 doctrine. The 
introduction of originalism into our analysis of Section 5, I argue, 
provides a basis to challenge the Boerne-assumption that the 
Courts alone are capable of producing constitutional meaning. 
As I have sought to show in the preceding pages, originalism 
challenges the premise of judicial interpretive supremacy in 
Section 5 jurisprudence in two ways, one historical, the other 
functional. As a matter of history, there is considerable evidence 
that the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not revolve around a judicial supremacist vision of constitutional 
interpretation. To the contrary, those who framed the Fourteenth 
Amendment and advocated for its passage and ratification 
assumed that Congress, not the courts, would take the lead in 
giving meaning to the general language of the Amendment’s first 
section. 
As a matter of function—that is, as a matter of creating 
constitutional practices that operate to protect the core principles 
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of the Constitution—placing judicial originalism into the 
foreground of our discussion of Section 5 jurisprudence offers 
additional support for a broader reading of the congressional 
enforcement power than currently exists today under the doctrinal 
standard of Boerne. 
Araiza argues that his approach offers a way in which the 
Court can reconcile “its insistence on stating constitutional 
meaning and its ostensible respect for congressional 
determinations that Congress is best-suited to make.”59 These 
goals, I suggest, are in some tension with one another. These 
tensions are placed in sharp relief when we consider the judge-
centered rationales that bolstered originalism’s rise to prominence 
as a method of judicial constitutional interpretation. Attention to 
the competencies of Congress indicates that the Court should be 
less insistent on its claims for interpretive supremacy; or, at least 
it should be less insistent in its claims for supremacy over the 
proper methodology by which the meaning of the Constitution can 
be discerned. 
In situations where judges cannot justify robust Fourteenth 
Amendment rights protections on originalist grounds, they should 
welcome congressional initiatives that expand rights protections 
under its enforcement authority. Recognizing a potential gap 
between judicial interpretation of Section 1 and congressional 
enforcement of Section 5 offers a way to protect the integrity of 
originalism as a theory as well as the legitimacy of the courts. 
Originalism is most powerful as an interpretive theory designed to 
impose meaningful limits on judges. Its constraints need not, and 
perhaps should not, similarly constrain Congress when it acts 
under its Section 5 authority. This is the approach Justice Black 
embraced in the 1960s. Extending broad deference to Congress 
when enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights he believed better 
justified his commitment to the constraints of textualism and 
originalism. If future Congresses were to do more to exercise their 
enforcement authority to protect the rights of Americans—
whether they be the religious, economic, or gun rights favored by 
the conservatives, or the antidiscrimination agenda favored by 
liberals—originalist judges might want to reconsider Boerne’s 
premise of judicial interpretive supremacy.  
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